GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVIL PROCEDURE

INTRODUCTION
[T]he business of litigation, like commerce itself, has become increasingly international.
The train trip from Delhi to Kanniyakumari -a small town at the southern tip of India -takes about three days. I recently made this trip. One of the stops along the way was at the city of Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh. When looking at the faces of people going about their business at the Bhopal train station and surrounding areas, it was difficult to insult to injury, one recent report indicates that "the site, which still has not been cleaned up, may be leaking contaminants into local groundwater." '" So what about civil procedure? On one hand, the civil procedure rules and texts that cover my desk in Canada could not have seemed farther away at the time of my visit to Bhopal. On the other hand, however, they could not have felt closer. After all, it was a civil procedure process -interpreted and applied thousands of miles away in the State of New York -that had perhaps the biggest single impact on how the Bhopal disaster has been handled legally over the past 20 years.
After the devastation, victims and their families sought significant compensation through litigation in a federal court in the Southern District of New York. Before the merits of the case were reached, the case was "dismissed"'' in the U.S. on a procedural motion, "on the grounds offorum non conveniens,'I2 in "deference to the Indian government's efforts ... to pursue a global resolution in India."' 3 After years of ongoing litigation in India and again (unsuccessfully) in the U.S., a settlement of approximately one eighth of the initial claim was reached on behalf of the victims.'
4 Notwithstanding the settlement, to a large extent these victims have felt this amount to be seriously "inadequate."
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Civil procedure is, in the end, about power. It is about power -albeit often retrospectively -to regulate individual and corporate behaviour. It is about power to manage efficiently and resolve expectations, transactions, and disputes. And, ultimately, it is about power to access meaningful substantive rights and remedies in a fair and fulsome way.' 6 In the context of globalization and international human rights, far from merely being a tool of parochial domestic process, civil procedure has become a gatekeeper in this era of modern commerce and social intercourse: a gatekeeper to the access of meaningful justice -through the protection and/or the recognition of basic rights and liberties -for parties involved in civil matters with global contacts.
In addition to my visit through Bhopal, it has been my experience as a professor of both civil procedure and international law that has prompted my interest in this cross-doctrinal research, and more specifically, the important but seldom-discussed links between globalization and international human rights on the one hand and civil procedure on the other.' 7 Teaching civil procedure is a notoriously difficult task. As Mr. Justice C6t of the Alberta Court of Appeal, one of the leading Canadian thinkers in the area of civil procedure
Ibid. For a further discussion of the environmental contamination of the Bhopal disaster, see Bano Motion, supra note 2 at 3-8. Union Carbide, supra note 2 at 867.
Ibid.
Second, to help facilitate the first aspect of the project, the article makes these important connections -in contemplation of the specific context of teaching civil procedure -in order to help bring alive the power and increasingly-global context of civil procedure for the benefit of civil procedure students. It is this second aspect of the project that makes it pedagogical in nature.
The article is structurally divided into three main parts that correspond to the three topics set out in the title. The exercise of linking these topics largely culminates in Part IV. There, I look at four relevant "civil procedure tools": primarily jurisdictional tools, as applied in Union Carbide and other cases, class actions, the recognition of foreign judgments, and discovery in extraterritorial jurisdictions. This discussion of civil procedure tools and cases is used to link those tools and cases to the topics of globalization and international human rights developed in Parts II and Ill.
II. GLOBALIZATION
So what am I talking about when I refer to "globalization" in this article? Globalization is a notoriously thorny and elusive concept. According to one commentator, "[globalization exists today as perhaps the most widely cited (yet least understood) concept in academic discourse."
24 Elsewhere I have argued that the term "globalization" evades simple definition. 25 More than simply an historically-contingent event, globalization is a nuanced and expansive process involving a wide range of geographically-relevant political, economic, social and cultural connections and changes that are being created by and visited upon our personal and community affairs. It therefore involves -in this broad sense -much more than what is often seen largely as a process of increased and interconnected trade, technology, and the movement of capital. 26 For purposes of this project, however, I am primarily interested in only part of this broad concept of globalization: private commerce. A defining characteristic of this narrow aspect of globalization has been the internationalization of commercial affairs, largely through the presence of MNCs -as evidenced by the name itself-in various jurisdictions around the world. 27 According to Stephens, MNCs "are the driving force behind the global economy.,
Further, as another commentator recently acknowledged:
[o]ne feature of economic globalization has been the great diversilication of corporate holdings, both in terms of commodity portfolios and geographical spheres of operation, and a company's plant, equipment, and other assets will frequently be located in a strategic range of countries. Such diversification characterizes the corporate behaviour of vast multinational corporations.... This collective burgeoning oftransnational activity is seen most clearly in ... international commerce.
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In a nutshell, when talking about globalization in this article, I am largely contemplating the global activities of MNCs. For further clarification, this narrow sense of globalization does not focus on issues of public international trade policy. Public international trade, and its impact on human rights, has been the topic of vocal discussion for some time now, most publicly at anti-globalization protests 30 at and since the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle. 3 ' For purposes of this project, therefore, I am more interested in private commercial activitywhich, while perhaps facilitated by public international trade regimes, 32 has traditionally been regulated, if at all, largely by domestic legislation, rules of civil procedure, and private international law. My focus, therefore, is private commercial activity and its important connections with international human rights and civil procedure.
27
For a recent discussion of this aspect of globalization, see e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its .
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Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit," supra note 23 at ff. 
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The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has argued that, "[als is evident from the public protests at the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in November 1999, opposition to globalization is rising. This is based at least in part on concerns that an expanding global economy is not adequately addressing human rights, labor rights, and environmental needs." (Lawyers Committee for Human
Several characteristics of this narrow view of globalization are worth highlighting here. First, in terms of its intersection with issues of international human rights, commercial globalization has traditionally been indifferent to the protection and fostering of human rights and, more generally, to the interests of the oppressed. Bhopal is but one example of how commercial globalization often has a significant negative impact on the basic rights of individuals. In addition, the more far-reaching this aspect of modern globalization becomes, the more it will be felt in personal and community affairs around the world. As Robert McCorquodale has recently commented:
[t]he apparent lack of concern of corporations or the business community for the plight of the oppressed has been a recurring theme ofsocial commentators throughout the centuries.... At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the internationalization of corporations -and the creation of "global business" -has pushed this theme onto a wider canvas. This has occurred mainly due to the processes of economic globalisation.
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Second, given its de-centralized and largely private nature, international commercial activity is a notoriously difficult aspect of globalization for states to regulate publicly. As Beth Stephens has noted, the "modern multinational corporation ... model has proven difficult to regulate with the legal tools available to the governments of sovereign states." 3 4
Put simply, the activities of MNCs have been typically able to fly under the radar of much domestic and international regulation. For example, as evidenced by the massive 1997 crash of the Asian markets, governments have found themselves unable to control predictably the reach, depth and speed of global economic and commercial activity. 35 According to Professor John Jackson:
[t] [he pace of international economic activity and the developing interdependence of national economies is head spinning. Governments increasingly find it difficult to implement worthy policies concerning economic activity because such activity often crosses borders in ways that escape the reach of much of national government control.
36
It is in the regulation of commercial globalization -and more specifically, its impact on international human rights-where civil procedure enters the scene. This discussion will be developed further in Part IV. First, in Part III, I discuss what I mean by the term "international human rights."
Ill. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Traditionally, human rights have been thought of as matters of domestic jurisdiction.
37
Prior to World War I1, international law was largely silent on the r'egulation and enforcement A.
THE "INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS"
1.
BACKGROUND
So what is specifically contemplated by the term "international human rights" in this 
44
See infra Part III.C.
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For purposes of further clarity, this article does not purport to address head on the topic of U.S. civil human rights litigation. This tradition is discussed briefly in the context of the broader arguments being advanced in this article (see infra note 139). However, given the meaningful differences in the U.S, legislative and constitutional frameworks in this area, I do not purport to provide a comprehensive review and analysis ofthat jurisprudence and tradition. For useful discussions ofthat jurisprudence, see e.g. Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga," supra note 22 at II Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit," supra note 23 at ff. years with the important work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 47 and the creation of ad hoc war crimes tribunals 4 " and the ICC. 49 However, as evidenced by the basic United Nations human rights regimes, 5° the concept of "international human rights" includes a much broader spectrum of rights and remedies beyond the criminal and war crimes contexts. It is this broader spectrum of international human rights that is most relevant to the discussion in this article.
The foundational document that provides the basis for this broad spectrum of rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 5 As stated in its preamble, the "peoples of the United Nations have ... determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 5 The UDHR essentially enumerates the aspirational rights, discussed further herein, 53 that are generally contemplated in the preamble of the U.N. Charter.
The aspirational rights and principles set out in the UDHR have been given more meaningful content by the international community through the International Covenant on 4 1 have discussed elsewhere the significant international efforts of NGOs. See e.g. Farrow, supra note 25 at 193-95. One important example includes the work done by the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (WCGJ) (see ibid at 190-91, 194-95). The WCGJ was established by a number of women human rights activists prior to the preparatory meetings for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (see infra note 49). The stated goals of the WCGJ included: (i) "[tlo ensure a worldwide participation of women's human rights advocates in the negotiations of the [CC treaty to lobby for an eflective and independent court"; (ii) "...to educate government[] delegations and mainstream Human Rights NGOs on their commitments to women and the need to integrate a gender perspective into the U.N.". and (iii) to educate "... on women's human rights and raise public awareness ofthe horrific nature ofcrimes committed against women."(WCGJ, "About the Caucus," online: WCGJ <www.iccwomen.addr.com/caucus/about.htm>). In connection with the ICC conference, the WCGJ played a significant role in shaping the vision, mandate and ultimate successful establishment of the ICC. A key element to the WCGJ's creation and ultimate success was its founding members' vision that, if left to the mainstream human rights NGOs, women's concerns would not be "appropriately defended and promoted" (ibid A number of specific rights included in the international bill of rights are relevant for the purposes of this project. The first -and perhaps the most significant -is the right to an effective legal remedy. 7 As a starting point, the UDHR provides that: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him [or her] by the constitution or by law."" 5 As Beth Stephens has summarized, the ICCPR provides that the UDHR's "effective remedy" provided for in article 8 requires states "to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy" and "to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted." ' 9 Further, article 14 of the ICCPR provides specifically that "[in the determination of... rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.", 60 The UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR also contemplate other potentially relevant rights, including: the right to own property and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived thereof; These are the kinds of international human rights that are contemplated by this project. More specifically, they are of the kinds that are increasingly involved -often negativelyin the context of commercial globalization. It is these rights that will be discussed, through their relation to civil procedure, in Part IV of this article.
B.
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
In addition to the principles and rights set out in the international bill of rights, a further initiative aimed at governing, among other things, the impact of MNCs on international human rights, is the creation of voluntary corporate codes of conduct. For example, and perhaps most notably, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact at the 1999 World Economic Forum. As he stated at that meeting:
[g]lobalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The problem is this. The spread of markets outpaces the ability of societies and their political systems to adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History teaches us that such an imbalance between the economic, social and political realms can never be sustained for very long.... and enact a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, and environmental practices.
67
The Global Compact was formally launched at the U.N. Headquarters in New York on 26 July 2000. Essentially, the Global Compact is an international initiative designed to bring companies together with U.N. agencies and labour and civil society stakeholders to support fundamental human rights, labour, and environment principles. 72 While not binding in nature, it does encourage a broad-based corporate participation in the international human rights initiative. At present, the model largely contemplates companies reporting their human rightsrelated activities and initiatives in their annual reports.
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Other non-binding initiatives aimed at the regulation of corporate activity and its impact on human rights around the world -while "uncertain" and not "conclusive ' 7 4 -have also been experimented with and implemented. 7 While none of these codes is currently binding, they do demonstrate a movement toward corporate accountability for human rights-related matters that seems currently to be gaining strength and momentum. They also provide further support for the application of broad international human rights principles to corporate activity around the world. It is this application -of international human rights standards to private actors -that is discussed in the next section of this article.
C. APPLICATION TO INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS
It is important to recognize that the international bill of rights, as supported by voluntary codes, provides for the promotion of human rights not only by states, but also by individuals as well. For example, the UDHR provides that, in addition to states, "every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive ... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and ... to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance."" 0 Similarly, like the UDHR, both the ICCPR and ICESCR include in their preambles that "the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he [or she] belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.,''"
And to the extent that the international bill of rights applies to individuals, it has been interpreted also to apply to corporations. As Louis Henkin has commented: "[e]very individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all."
2 Further, as Stephens has argued, "[c]orporations are independent legal entities, subject to international and domestic regulation and capable of being held legally accountable for their actions. When an international agreement applies broadly to all actors, it applies to corporations as well."
3 In this line of thinking, Stephens has further argued that:
[t]he international community has determined over the past fifty years that certain actions are prohibited and constitute violations of international law.... Most of the international agreements that codify these and other human rights obligations are addressed to states, calling on states to enforce the listed obligations. But the norms embedded in the agreements bind the behavior of private individuals and corporations alike. International law has never been limited to regulating state behavior. Over the past fifty years, the international community has moved decisively to expand not only the rights of non-state actors but their responsibilities as well.
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UDHR, supra note 5 1, preamble.
81
The same text is found in both documents: ICCPR, supra note 54, preamble, ICESCR, supra note 55, preamble. My thoughts on this aspect of the discussion have been influenced by Beth Stephens, See
Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit," supra note 23 at ff. V.B.I. Further, specific rights contemplated by the international bill of rights have been argued to apply to corporations as well as to individuals. As Bell has argued, the right of "access to a court," the "opportunity for a fair hearing" and the "right to freedom of expression" ought to and/or do "extend to corporations." 85 In the case of the Bhopal disaster, for example, in addition to the right to a fair and public hearing, 86 other rights might be seen to apply, including: the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property; adequate protection of the home; safe and healthy working conditions; adequate standards of living conditions; the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; and access to the enjoyment and utility of natural resources.
However, notwithstanding the broad inclusive language of the international bill of rights, the application of specific international human rights norms to private actors -most notably to corporations -continues to be a controversial project in this era of commercial globalization. As mentioned above, 8 international law traditionally has been thought of as a regulatory framework for states. Rights claims and protections -to the extent that they are governed by international documents -are still largely available to individuals through states 89 or to individuals against states.
9
" This includes proceedings brought by states or individuals in international tribunals or in domestic tribunals involving state actors.
' There is still considerable resistance to human rights claims -based on international human rights regimes -being made available directly against individuals, particularly in domestic tribunals.
However, recognition of the important application of international human rights norms to individuals and corporations, together with the evolution of codes of conduct, 92 shows that this resistance is changing. As McCorquodale has rightly commented, while "international legal ... that violate human rights will be subject to international and national legal regulation."" 3 This article does not purport to provide a comprehensive treatment of the recent move towards private enforcement of international human rights regimes. 94 However, I rely on the proposition that international human rights tools are becoming increasingly engaged by the actions of private actors -specifically MNCs -in the context and wake of commercial globalization. 9 "
When it comes to looking at globalization -specifically commercial globalization through the affairs of MNCs -there is clearly more than just money involved. As the Bhopal disaster demonstrated, our globalized economy and private commercial affairs are often doing damage to fundamental rights and interests of individuals around the world. 96 As the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has argued: "[w]ith the rapid growth of the global economy in the last twenty years, the linkages between human rights, trade, the labor movement, and the activities of multinational corporations have taken on new importance." 97 Again, as the Bhopal disaster demonstrates, this impact is acutely troubling in the developing world. As one report has indicated, "[d]eveloping countries ... are particularly vulnerable ... they compete globally to attract multinational companies for their investment and capital, and in this process, often tend to ignore the safety and health violations that many
MNC[]s engage in."
98 Similarly, Jamie Cassels has commented that developing nations:
confer upon MNC[]s a competitive advantage because they offer low-cost labor, access to markets, and lower operating costs. Once there, companies have little incentive to minimize environmental and human risks. Lax environmental and safety regulation, inadequate capital investment in safety equipment, and poor communications between companies and governments compound the problem.
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Given these concerns, calls are being made for further corporate responsibility for international human rights violations. For example, Amnesty International has argued that MN Cs:
have a responsibility to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights. In an increasingly globalized world economy, their decisions and actions impact directly on governmental policies and on the enjoyment of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls on "every individual and every organ of society" to play its part in securing universal observance of human rights. Companies and financial
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Supra note 28 at 114.
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For a useful discussion of these issues, see e.g. Kinley, supra note 82 at 40-44.
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See e.g. Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit," supra note 23 at ff. V.B. 1.
'X,
For a useful discussion on the "century of the corporation," arguing that "the corporate form now dominates every aspect of our lives," [b]ig corporations have the power to bring great benefits to poor communities -but they can cause great damage too: through degradation of the environment, exploitation ofeconomically weak communities, the use of child labour. In recent years there has been an increasing awareness on the part of business that it must face up to its responsibilities in the human rights field. 102 These concerns, particularly in relation to MNC activity in the developing world, have led to the creation and promotion of international corporate codes of conduct"' and the call for the application of international human rights regimes to be applied to the activities of MNCs.
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Charlesworth and Chinkin have pointed out that "[t]he two major challenges to all human rights ... in the twenty-first century will be the forces of religious extremism and of economic globalization."" ' Specifically with respect to economic globalization, domestic laws need to be drafted and interpreted to accommodate these challenges. As Castel and Walker have further commented: "Now that international law is increasingly applicable to matters once thought subject only to national laws, new rules may have to be fashioned." ' ' O Essentially, therefore, what is at issue here is the ever-expanding "privatization" of international human rights in the context of commercial globalization: the move that has allowed "domestic courts [to] operate as a public conduit for the flow of international human rights obligations into the private sphere." ' ' This move toward the privatization of international human rights by their application to MNCs through domestic courts is, in my view, of growing and critical importance in the work of civil procedure. Regulating disputes involving this convergence of globalization and international human rights through tools of civil procedure is thus the subject of Part V1 of this article. 
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC CIVIL COURTS
The modern atmosphere in which the civil justice system operates has become increasingly international. According to La Forest J., "[tihe business community operates in a world economy and we correctly speak of a world community even in the face of decentralized political and legal power."' 8 Similarly, as Cumming J. recently acknowledged, "[a]s a result of the inexorable forces of globalization and expanding international free trade and open markets, there will be an ever-increasing inter-jurisdictional presence of corporate enterprises."' 0 9
As a result of this modern, globalized atmosphere,'' it is clear that the business of domestic litigation has also become increasingly international. While this article does not attempt to provide statistical support for this proposition"' in terms of the internationalization of cases and litigants before the courts, there is no lack of support from judges," ' 6 Further, as Janet Walker has argued, in the first few decades of the twenty-first century, national courts will "re-establish[] their primacy as fora for dispute resolution, including international dispute resolution." '' 7 As a result of the internationalization of cases and litigants before domestic courts largely resulting from commercial globalization -the interpretation of domestic procedural laws in turn has become of increased interest and importance. For example, Sopinka J., citing Dicey and Morris,"' acknowledged that issues of domestic process" 9 have become more significant in our modern economy: "This topic has become of increasing modern importance as a result of a variety of factors including the greater ease of communication and travel; the tendency of courts in many countries to extend their jurisdiction over events and persons outside their territory; and a greater awareness of foreign laws and procedures. ' For this reason, the "content" of domestic laws "must be adjusted in the light of a changing world order."' ' 22 In essence,judges have now been mandated, when interpreting domestic procedural laws, to take into account -and more specifically, to " Or, put another way, according to Sopinka J., "parochial" judicial attitudes are "no longer appropriate." ' 2 6 In the context of this article, thisjudicial mandate is equally significant. When considering domestic cases involving potential international human rights elements, interpretations of local procedural rules need to be acutely aware of, and open to, the potential negative impacts of commercial globalization, largely in the form of the "ever-increasing interjurisdictional presence" of MNCs. Judicial "parochial[ism]" is clearly not "appropriate." In light of increased global pressures, domestic processes need to be seen as tools of power that increasingly and dramatically affect the decisions and lives of individuals beyond the limited jurisdiction of the forum state. Here is where the intersection of globalization, 2 7 international human rights 2 8 and civil procedure comes alive.
There are several elements of the general topic of "civil procedure" that are implicated in this discussion. 2 9 In Part IV.B, I look primarily at procedural issues involving jurisdiction.
I then, in Part IV.C, briefly discuss several other procedural tools -including class actions, the recognition of foreign judgments, and discovery in extraterritorial jurisdictions -that are becoming increasingly important in the context of regulating the impact of commercial globalization on international human rights through domestic civil courts. 
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In choosing these specific procedures, I have been influenced by the following statement by Sopinka J., made in the context of ajurisdictional challenge, which contemplates a number of these procedures:
With the increase of free trade and the rapid growth of multi-national corporations it has become more difficult to identify one clearly appropriate forum... .The defendant may not be identified with only one jurisdiction. Moreover, there are frequently multiple defendants carrying on business in a number of jurisdictions and distributing their products or services world-wide. As well, the plaintiffs may be a large class residing in different jurisdictions. It is often difficult to pinpoint the place where the transaction giving rise to the action took place. Frequently, there is no single forum that is clearly the most convenient or appropriate for the trial of the action... In some jurisdictions, novel principles requiring joinder of all who have participated in a field of commercial activity have been developed for determining how liability should be apportioned among defendants. In this climate, courts have had to become more tolerant of the systems of other countries (Amchem, supra note I at 333-34).
"3
Some of the tools discussed in Parts IV.B-C of this article -particularly those related to jurisdiction -although properly part of this discussion, are equally issues of private international law or conflict of laws. The term "private international law" is often thought to include "conflict of laws" or choice of law principles. As Joel Paul has outlined, these private "principles" consist of"domestic legal principles that determine jurisdiction to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate claims involving foreign interests or persons" (" procedural tools have been chosen as examples of how civil procedure has become a gatekeeper to the access of meaningful justice -through the protection and/or recognition of basic rights and liberties -for parties involved in civil matters with multi-jurisdictional contacts.
B. JURISDICTION
Perhaps the most important area of civil procedure to be involved in this intersection with globalization and international human rights isjurisdiction. As one commentator has recently argued in the context of the "challenges posed ... by the forces of globalization," the "reality of human interaction is chafing against the strictures our current conception of legal jurisdiction imposes." [Tihe principle of international comity, also known as the "comity of nations doctrine," permits aggressive" jurisdictional remedy is the anti-suit injunction.' 34 The Ontario Court of Appeal recently described these issues ofjurisdiction, in the context of civil procedure, as emerging from a "rapidly evolving area of law."' 35 As the Court stated:
Until the early 1990s, this area was governed by a set of rigid common law rules developed in England in the 19th century. These rules ... were shaped by the sovereignty concerns ofa dominant 19th-century world power anxious to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and jealous of any attempt by fbreign states to intrude.
Towards the end of the 20th century. it became increasingly apparent that these rules were out of keeping with the reality of modem interprovincial and international commerce and the frequent and rapid movement of people, goods and services across borders. 1 36 Again, the theme of power is raised. The question of whether a court is willing to grant or deny jurisdiction over a given cause of action or litigant becomes, in the end, a question of power. Because different justice will be dispensed in differentjurisdictions, the decision to afford or deny jurisdiction is a threshold decision that ultimately may mean the difference between meaningful justice gained and meaningful justice denied. 37 As Berman has argued, "[a]n assertion of jurisdiction, therefore, is never simply a legal judgment, but a socially embedded, meaning-producing act.'' 
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Muscut, supra note 132 at 27.
17
As Beth Stephens argued in the specific context of human rights litigation, "minor differences in roughly analogous systems combine to dramatically alter the legal landscape" ("Translating Fildrliga," supra note 22 at 27.) See also Bell, Forum Shopping, supra note 29 at 26-38.
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In the following three sections, I will look at three jurisdictional determinations: from the U.S., 9 England, and Canada. These cases provide important examples of how threshold procedural decisions -particularly in the context ofcommercial globalization-potentially intersect with international human rights to create power-providing, "meaning-producing" acts.
I .
UNION CARBIDE
The Union Carbide case, perhaps better than any other, demonstrates why jurisdictional determinations -fundamentally questions of procedural power -are such important, "meaning-producing"' 40 decisions in the context of civil litigation. As briefly discussed above, 4 ' thousands of residents of the City of Bhopal in central India suffered injury and death on the night of 2-3 December 1984. The tragedy resulted from a massive leak of the highly toxic methyl isocyanate gas -used to make Sevin and Temik pesticides -at UCC's Bhopal chemical plant (UCIL).1 4 2 U,3 As discussed above (supra note 45 and accompanying text), this article does not purport to provide a comprehensive review of U.S. civil human rights litigation. However, given that the Union Carbide progeny (see e.g. Bano, supra note 2) involve some of these principles, and further, given the potential relevance to the ideas discussed in this article, I will briefly discuss this issue here. In addition to general U.S.jurisdictional approaches (see e.g. the Court's approach in Union Carbide, supra note 2 and infra Part IV.B. 1) a separate head of "long-arm" jurisdiction is provided for in the U. 46 Essentially, as Keenan J. indicated, "Piper teaches a straightforward formulation of the doctrine offorum non conveniens. A district court is advised to determine first whether the proposed alternative forum is 'adequate'.... Then ... the district court should consider relevant public and private interest factors ... in order to determine whether dismissal is favored."' 47 According to Keenan J., again relying on Piper, "a plaintiffs choice of forum" is entitled to "great deference" when the forum chosen is "the home of the plaintiff." When the plaintiff "is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable ... a foreign plaintiffs choice deserves less deference."' 48 In sum, the Court was asked to determine which forum "will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice."'
49
Guided by these principles, Keenan J. reviewed the various connecting factors including the location of the accident, injury, evidence and witnesses, issues of administrability, and other public and private interests. After weighing these factors, the Court determined that the Indian Courts would be better situated to handle the claims, thereby granting UCC's motion resulting in the dismissal of the consolidated claim in the U.S. Union Carbide, supra note 2 at 845.
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Ibid.
'49
Reilly, supra note 138 at 36.
[50 In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears to have been most influenced, in its ultimate determination, not on its initial review of the relevant private and public interest and policy factors, but rather, on its concluding sovereignty-based argument that India should be permitted to resolve the case in its own courts. As Keenan J. stated, "To deprive the Indian judiciary of this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a history of subservience and subjugation from which India has emerged. India and its people cai and must vindicate their claims before the independent and legitimate judiciary created there since the Independence of 1947" (Union Carbide, supra note 2 at 867).
$500 million. 5 ' The settlement was made pursuant to orders of the Supreme Court of India that validated the civil suit settlement, but did not ultimately end the criminal proceedings. 152 This settlement amount was significantly less -"paltry" according to one commentator 15 3
-than would be typically expected from a U.S. jury award.' 54 The plaintiffs "have largely felt the settlement deal to be inadequate." '1 55 Important to this analysis is the recognition of the disappointment of the victims and their families with respect to the resulting compensation. Given the continuous litigation efforts and international outcry that resulted from the case's dismissal in the U.S., the view that an injustice was visited upon the victims and their families -through the refusal to allow the case to proceed in the U.S. -is not particularly controversial.' 56 Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer of the Indian judiciary recently commented on the Bhopal disaster and its subsequent handling. In his remarks he commented that in the context of "globalization," operations from the U.S. "can pollute India" and produce "incalculable damage to Indian people."' 57
Perhaps equally significant, however, is the systemic recognition that this type of "incalculable damage" directly involves important international human rights. The Union Carbide case clearly raises serious concerns about whether the plaintiffs were ultimately granted, "in a suit at law," a "fair ... hearing by a competent ... tribunal."'1 5 8
There is no allegation here that the Indian judicial system is not, as a general matter, competent. However, a key element of the Union Carbide case was India's own submission that questioned its ability adequately to conduct the Bhopal litigation. 5 ' Through its submissions and expert evidence, as supported by submissions from several amicus curiae,
60
India identified several areas of concern with its legal system. Procedurally, India argued that its legal system was inadequate for the Bhopal litigation in a number of ways, including: a "lack of broad-based legislative activity"; "inaccessibility of legal information and legal services"; "burdensome court filing fees"; "limited innovativeness with reference to legal practice and education"; "delay and backlog"; a "lack[]" of "wherewithal ... to deal 
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See ibid. at para. 146.
"5
Even if a U.S. court had taken the case but applied Indian law, if the case were heard by a U.S. civil jury, there is a significant likelihood that damages would have been higher than those upon which the parties ultimately settled. See Scott, supra note 153 at 1079. See further supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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The amicus curiae included the Citizens Commission on Bhopal, the National Council of Churches, and the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, etal See Union Carbide, supra note 2 at 847, n. 4.
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(2003) 41:3 effectively and expeditiously" with the case; a bar that "lack[s] specialization, practical investigative techniques and coordination into partnerships" that "limit[s]" its "ability to handle the ... litigation"; "pre-trial discovery" that is "inadequate"; a "lack of devices for third-party impleader or for organizing complex cases"; a lack of "class action procedure"; an "unavailability ofjuries or contingency fee arrangements"; and the fact that "a judgment rendered by an Indian court cannot be enforced in the United States without resort to further extensive litigation."" ' India identified equally problematic substantive hurdles, including: a tort law system that was "not sufficiently developed to accommodate the Bhopal claims"; "little reported case law in the tort field to serve as precedent"; and "no tort law relating to disputes arising out of complex product or design liability.""16 2
In sum, according to India's own submissions, these procedural and substantive "deficiencies" would "thwart the victims' quest" for "justice."' 63 In response to all of the concerns raised by the Indian Government, defense experts argued that India's legal system was up to the task of handling the litigation." In my view, however, as set out above, 65 notwithstanding competing expert evidence, there clearly were serious issues as to India's ability -in this case and on its own admission -to provide the plaintiffs with access to meaningful, "competent" justice.
While not at issue on the procedural motion before the Court, other basic international human rights discussed above were also clearly affected, 66 including the right against arbitrary deprivation of property and rights to adequate protections of the home, working conditions, standards of living, and environmental and industrial hygiene. Whether claims for violations of these rights would have succeeded is an open question. However, given the various threshold jurisdictional refusals, 67 none of these substantive rights was litigated.
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Ibid. at 847-52.
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Ibid. at 849.
"
Ibid. at 847.
"65
See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Parts III.A and C.
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See Union Carbide, supra note 2; and Bano, supra note 2.
"6K
For example, the claims in Bano alleged essentially 15 violations of U.S. and international law including allegations based on: criminal activity; racial discrimination; cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment; violations of the right to life, health and security of the person; violations of international environmental law; gross violations of human rights; civil contempt; fraud; negligence; public and private nuisance; trespass; and other issues involving strict liability, medical monitoring and other equitable relief. In terms of the specific alleged human rights violations, the class action complaint set out the following allegations: Union Carbide's conduct ... amounted to a consistent pattern of gross violations of recognized human rights insofar as Union Carbide operated and maintained a plant in Bhopal, India which continuously posed a grave risk of death and/or serious physical injury to the surrounding population; that each incident manifesting its depraved indifference to the grave risks posed to that population amounted to a violation of recognized human rights to life, health and security of the person; that there were several, repeated incidents of such toxic leakage which injured workers and hundreds of nearby residents; and that Union Carbide on each occasion ignored the grave risk of death and serious physical injury posed by its facility in Bhopal. In addition, Union Carbide's conduct after the Bhopal gas disaster demonstrates a consistent pattern of gross violations of recognized human rights because of its failure to provide adequate information about MIC [gas] to those treating the victims, including, but not limited to, Union Carbide's failure to disclose any information on the medical consequences, toxicity or ultrahazardous character of MIC prior to and after the occurrence of the Disaster. Further, Union Carbide's purposeful absconding from the In terms of the "correctness" of the Union Carbide decision, there is no doubt that the argument could be made (as it was, and as the Court accepted) that India had a "significant relationship" with the matters at issue in the litigation. Further, it can be seen that India also had a clear "interest" in the litigation. On this literal reading, there were reasonable bases for the decision. However, the arguments against the U.S. Court taking jurisdiction might have been stronger had India, as representative plaintiff, not been a party to the litigation. In its submissions, according to the reasons of Keenan J., India "argued that the courts of India are not up to the task of conducting the Bhopal litigation."' 69 Notwithstanding this assertion, the Court rejected India's stated interest and concern, finding instead, on India's behalf, that its courts "have the proven capacity to mete out fair and equal justice."'
70
As can be seen through the Bhopal experience, domestic procedural determinations clearly have direct and determining implications for the potential acknowledgment and protection of fundamental human rights. As Mr. Justice Krishna lyer argued, courts therefore "need to be aware of more than just compensation."'' Had the Court in Union Carbide been willing to take a more commercially globalized, less sovereignty-based 2 view of the matter, and recognized that, by taking the benefit of its Indian location, UCC should also take responsibility for its local UCIL actions and the resulting impacts on the international human rights of local citizens, the result might have been different. The Court might have been more persuaded by the argument that the Federal Court in the U.S., and not the Bhopal District Court, particularly given the potential procedural and substantive hurdles raised in the case, 173 was the more appropriate place to litigate the matter in order to secure adequate and meaningful justice. 
173
See supra notes 161-62.
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Judge Keenan's approach in Union Carbide can be contrasted with the United States Supreme Court's approach in Hartford Fire, supra note 172. In that case -admittedly under different regulatory circumstances -the Court considered the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I. The case involved allegations of conspiracy by 19 states and a number of private plaintiffs that were brought in the U.S. against several London reinsurance companies. The plaintiffs alleged that the English companies conspired to coerce primary U.S. insurers to change the nature and coverage of their primary policies with respect to certain commercial general liability and environmental coverage in the U.S., specifically in California. The activity in question took place mainly in the U.K. The defendants were British corporations and British subjects with their principal place of business or residence outside of the U.S. It was also established that the U.K. had a comprehensive regulatory framework governing its reinsurance industry. The defendants pleaded that their actions did not offend against that U.K. framework. Notwithstanding these significant U.K. connections-together with an amicus curie brief filed by the U.K. Government objecting to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, the A similar view has been supported by Kanishka Jayasuriya who, when discussing the jurisdictional significance of the Hartford Fire 7 ' decision, commented that:
[T]he territorial model of sovereignty is giving way to more flexible notions ofjurisdiction based on effects rather than place of conduct. The debate over the consistency of the decision with the notions ofjurisdiction in international law is relevant in that it points to the elasticity of the notion of sovereignty in the face of the changing structure of global economic relations. 1
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On a more expansive, globalized view ofjurisdiction -based on a more "elastic[]" view of sovereignty -the Indian nationals, through the Government of India, should, in my view, have been afforded access to the litigation benefits that would have accompanied access to the home state of UCC. It was, however, a powerful tool of civil procedure -a threshold jurisdictional determination -that denied them that access and, in my view, adequate justice.
LUBBE
In Lubbe,1 7 1 the House of Lords was more recently faced with tragic claims involving over 3,000 plaintiffs from South Africa -mostly "black and of modest means"' 78 -seeking to sue the English parent company, Cape plc, for significant asbestos related injuries and deaths.
argument from which was not successful (see Symeonides et al., supra note 130 at 558) -a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that permitting these claims to be brought in a U.S. District Court under these circumstances did not necessarily offend against traditional conceptions of international comity (Hartford Fire at 799, Souter J.). The Court was obviously concerned about the practicalities of regulating insurance activities and anti-competitive activities that potentially involved U.S. nationals and industries, regardless of where the activities originated or took place. In so doing, it relied on an effects-based analysis of extraterritoriality, ignoring recent (more formal) comity-based U.S. precedents. The majority made no mention of its earlier holdings reiterating the presumption A determining factor in both the Union Carbide and Hartford Fire cases was obviously the location of the alleged damage. However, if a more expanded, global view of damage had been adopted, would the location of the damage then have been so clear? Take, for example, the Union Carbide case. What about other damaged interests, including those of U.S. environmental regulators and labour organizations, U.S. trade interests and foreign relations policies, other developing nations that may be forced to keep regulatory policies at a minimum in order to retain foreign corporate facilities, U.S. employees whose jobs may be lost as a result of "corporate flight" to jurisdictions with "cheaper" labour, regulatory and damages regimes, etc.? Clearly not all of these individuals and groups were parties to the litigation. But, even without acknowledging the human rights claims that were potentially at issue, can it be said that the damages involved in the case were limited to India, such that the U.S. did not have a viable interest in adjudicating the matter? For a useful consideration of some of these competing interests involved in the Union Carbide case. see Paul, "Isolation," supra note 130 at 177, in which Joel Paul described the decision as 'formalistic deference to sovereign equality.'" See also Joel Paul, "Comity in International Law" (1991) 32 Harv. Int'l L.J. I at 62-63. 70-71.
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Supra note 174. At issue were allegations against the defendant "as parent company which, knowing ... that exposure to asbestos was gravely injurious to health, failed to take proper steps to ensure that proper working practices were followed and proper safety precautions observed ... by its overseas subsidiaries. ' 
79
The case before the House of Lords was a jurisdictional appeal primarily based on principles offorum non conveniens. The defendant had responded to the plaintiffs' claim by moving to stay the proceedings against it in the U.K. The primary arguments in favour of the plaintiffs' position on the motion included that:
legal aid in South Africa had been withdrawn for personal injury claims, that there was no reasonable likelihood of any lawyer or group of lawyers being able or willing to fund proceedings of this weight and complexity under contingency fee arrangements ... and that there was no other available source of funding open to the plaintiffs.°8 0 As a result, in addition to forum non conveniens principles set out in Spiliada,'
8 ' the plaintiffs argued that their rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by section 6 of the ECHR 82 were at stake. 83
The Court, in reviewing the competing positions, applied the governing principles set out in Spiliada' 84 and Connelly.' 85 According to Spiliada, for forum non conveniens determinations, "a stay will only be granted ... where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e., in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends ofjustice. "' 86 This test essentially requires two considerations. First, " [i] n applying this principle the court's first task is to consider whether the defendant ... is able to discharge the burden ... not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum ... but to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate."' 87 If the court concludes at this stage that "there is no other available forum which is clearly more appropriate," that is "likely to be the end of the matter."' 
IX'
Supra note 183.
186 Spiliada, supra note 132 at 476, cited in Lubbe, supra note 132 at para. 16. 1"7 Lubbe, ibid at para. 17.
Second, however, "if the court concludes at that stage that there is some other available forum which primafacie is more appropriate ... it will ordinarily grant a stay unless the plaintiff can show that there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nevertheless not be granted."' 89 At this second stage of the analysis, the court will "concentrate its attention not only on factors connecting the proceedings with the foreign or the English forum ... but on whether the plaintiff will obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction."' 9° This step will be satisfied "only if the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not be done in the appropriate forum."'' Lubbe was essentially decided at the second step of the Spiliada test. As Bingham L.J. argued in his earlier Court of Appeal decision in Connelly, 9 2 proceedings should not be stayed if, as Bell has paraphrased, "that would have the practical effect of preventing a plaintiff from pursuing his or her rights anywhere."' 93 Although the Court ultimately found that ECHR article 6 added nothing to the Court's Spiliada-based reasoning,'
94 it is clear, as in the Union Carbide case, that human rights based issues were implicated.
9 ' In fact, Andrew Bell has argued that the "'justice' exception" to the Spiliada doctrine "provides the first and perhaps most obvious context in which human rights considerations may fall to be considered in the context of the practical operation of the principles of private international law."' 9 6 In
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Ibid. The Spiliada approach was usefully summarized, favourably, by Sopinka J. in Anchenm:
In Spiliada ... the House of Lords restated the rule and elaborated on its application. In particular, the court dealt with its application in what it considered two different circumstances. In the "as of right" cases in which the defendant was served in thejurisdiction, the burden of proof that a stay should be granted was on the defendant who was required to show that there is another forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action. This so-called "natural forum" is the one with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. If this first condition is established, a stay will be granted unless the plaintiff establishes special circumstances by reason of which justice requires that the trial take place in England. Mere loss of ajuridical advantage will not amount to an injustice if the court is satisfied that substantial justice will be done in the appropriate forum. In cases in which service is effected exjuris. the burden is on the plaintiff throughout and is the obverse of that applicable in cases as of right; that is, the plaintiff must show that England is clearly the appropriate forum. Lord Gotf provided some guidance with respect to the relevant factors that determine the appropriate forum. While not intending to provide an exhaustive list, His Lordship referred to the principal factors in his reasons at p. 478: "So it is for connecting factors in this sense that the court must first look; and these will include not only factors affecting convenience or expense (such as availability of witnesses), but also other factors such as the law governing the relevant transaction ... and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry on business." Amchem, supra note I at 339-40. Bell, ibid. at 155.
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Lubbe, supra note 132 at para. 3 1. In Lubbe, there was adequate room in the Spiliada exception -"circumstances by reason of which justice requires" -to refuse the stay. See Spiliada, supra note 132 at 478, Goff L.J.; and infra at note 215 and accompanying text.
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It is important to acknowledge that the Court in Lubbe expressly rejected ajurisdictional determination based on "questions ofjudicial amourpropre and political interest or responsibility." Rather, the Court preferred a determination based on its Spiliada test. In concurring reasons, Lord Hope of Craighead elaborated on this preference, specifically distinguishing the House of Lords' approach from that followed by "judges in the United States who would decide issues as to where a case ought to be tried on broad grounds of public policy: see ... Union Carbide and Piper" (Lubbe, supra note 132 at paras. 32, 49-52). "Human Rights and Transnational Litigation," supra note 85 at 119.
Lubbe, however, unlike in Union Carbide, the Court ultimately allowed the appeal and lifted the stay of the U.K. proceedings.
On the merits of Lubbe, the allegations against Cape plc -in substance -were closely analogous to ICESCR article 7 rights to "safe and healthy working conditions."' 97 On the threshold procedural motion, again like Union Carbide, access to meaningful justice, this time in the form of access to funding, was at issue. As Bell has further argued, access to justice considerations injurisdictional determinations "accord[] with the basic right enshrined in article 14(1) of the ICCPR ... in the determination of civil rights and obligations."' 8 Again, in Lubbe, we see the powerful and important intersection between globalization and international human rights on the one hand and domestic procedural determinations on the other.
3.
RECHERCHES INTERNATIONALES
A third case to consider the issue of access to the due process of law in the context of a preliminary civil procedural determination under the lens of globalization is the Quebec Superior Court's decision in Recherches Internationales. 99 In that case, the dam of a gold mine effluent treatment plant ruptured in the South American country of Guyana. The plant was owned by Omai Gold Mines Limited (Omai), a Guyanan corporation. Approximately 2.3 billion litres of liquid containing cyanide, heavy metals, and other pollutants spilled into several rivers, one of which was Guyana's main Essequibo waterway.
There were approximately 23,000 Guyanese victims of the spill. They brought a class action in Quebec against Cambior Inc. (Cambior), a Quebec corporation and 65 percent owner of Omai. In determining whether Quebec was the appropriate forum for the litigation in the face of a forum non conveniens challenge, the Court acknowledged that the "well-established common law doctrine offorum non conveniens was incorporated into the Quebec Civil Code under Article 3135.,,212 When interpreting Article 3135, the Court further indicated that "common law precedents ... serve as a useful guide in interpreting Article 3 135. ' ' 2°3 The ICESCR, supra note 55, art. 7(b). See also supra note 63.
1'9
"Human Rights and Transnational Litigation," supra note 85 at 12 1. Further, see Lord Goff's comments in Spiliada in which he specifically acknowledged that the factor of whether a plaintiff will "obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction" -established "objectively by cogent evidence" -is a factor that will require judicial consideration beyond the typical connecting factors (see Spiliada, supra note 132 at 478 Ibid. at para. 1.
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Ibid. at para. 28. As the Court indicated, Article 3135 provides that: "Even though a Quebec authority has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may exceptionally and on an application by a party, decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities of another country are in a better position to decide." (Ibid.) 20,3
Ibid. at para. 31. Court then looked "in particular" to the Amchem case. 2 0 4 In Amchem, after favourably reviewing the English authorities including Spiliada, Sopinka J. provided that the test in Canada, although guided by those English authorities, was to be essentially a one-step question: "is there a more appropriate jurisdiction based on the relevant factors[?]"
2°5
When evaluating whether to allow the class action to proceed in Quebec, the Court considered the important issue of whether the plaintiffs would have access to meaningful justice in Guyana."
6 Competing pictures of Guyana's legal capacities were presented to the Court. Citing several sources inc!uding the 1996 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights and Prime Minister Janet Jagan, the plaintiffs' expert argued at the time of the hearing that the administration of law in Guyana had "reached a state of collapse," that Guyana's judiciary was "corrupt"" 2 7 and demoralized, and that the "inefficiency of the judicial system is so great as to undermine due process."
2 The expert for the defendant Cambior disagreed with these statements, testifying to the adequacy of Guyana's legal system .209
In its decision, the Court preferred the evidence of Cambior's experts and, therefore, granted Cambior's motion. Significant to this determination was the Court's assessment of the credibility of the competing expert testimony.
2 "' Also significant was the Court's determination that based on this testimony, "justice would be rendered in Guyana."
However, regardless of the Court's ultimate conclusion, its consideration of access tojustice 204 Supra note I.
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Ibid. at 344. Justice Sopinka, unlike the Court in Spiliada, did not expressly adopt a second "justice exception" step in Anichem. However, the Amchem test, which includes "loss ofjuridical advantage" as being "weighed with the other factors," (ibid. at 343) has been interpreted to include this principle. See e.g. Recherches Internationales: "the mere loss of ajudicial [sic] advantage to the plaintiff will not amount to an injustice if the Court is satisfied that substantial justice will be done in the appropriate forum" (supra note 116 at para. 35). With this consideration in mind, the Court in Recherches Internationales expressly looked at the issue of the "interests of justice" as a separate factor in its delibertaion (see ibid. at paras. 82-99). This understanding of Amchem is further supported in the formulation of the Amchem test adopted by Arbour J.A., as she then was, concurring, in Frymer: "In all cases, the test is whether there clearly is a more appropriate jurisdiction than the domestic forum chosen by the plaintiff in which the case should be tried. The choice of appropriate forum is designed to ensure that the action is tried in thejurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties. All factors pertinent to making this determination must be considered" (Frymer, supra note 134 at 79 [emphasis added]). Further, Castel and Walker, when discussing Anichem, provide that: "Today in common law Canada, in all cases involving one or more legally relevant foreign elements, the task of the court is to apply 'principles designed to identify the most appropriate or appropriate forum for the litigation based on factors which connect the litigation and the parties to the competing fora.' In other words, is there an alternative forum that is clearly more convenient for the pursuit ofthe action andfor securing the ends ofjustice than the forum chosen by the plaintiff?" (supra note 106 at 13.5 [citations omitted, emphasis added]). See also Markus Kochnen, "Reasonable Expectations and a Principled Approach to Forum Shopping" (1997) 19 Advocates' Q. 310 at 319-320.
2M'
This consideration was raised -in the context of the Court's discretionary forum non conveniens deliberation -when comparing the legal systems of Guyana and Quebec in order "to determine whether the remedy sought by the plaintiffs is available in the foreign jurisdiction" (Recherches Internationales, supra note 116 at para. 98).
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This statement was apparently later recanted (see ibid. at para. 84).
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Ibid. at paras. 88-97. 210 Ibid. at para. 92.
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Ibid. at para. 97.
in the foreign jurisdiction again, like in Lubbe, demonstrates the critical importance of this fundamental right in the context of threshold domestic civil procedural determinations.
WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES
Union Carbide, Lubbe, and Recherches Internationales involve cases from the U.S., England and Canada. The tests, however, to determine whether to takej urisdiction are similar between these three common law countries. As Sopinka J. commented in Amchem, after reviewing the Spiliada and Piper decisions, together with authorities from Australian and New Zealand, 2 1 2 "the law in common law jurisdictions is, as observed by Lord Goff in Spiliada, remarkably uniform. While there are differences in the language used, each jurisdiction applies principles designed to identify the most appropriate forum for the litigation based on factors which connect the litigation and the parties to the competing fora." 2 13
As noted above, 21 4 one of the key elements of the Spiliada test is the "justice exception.
'2 5
It is this consideration, in my view, which provides the Court with the appropriate tool to take seriously the effects of modern commercial globalization when making critical jurisdictionbased determinations that will fundamentally determine the outcome, or even the viability, of a lawsuit potentially involving international human rights. 
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For a useful discussion of universal jurisdiction in the context of human rights litigation, see Stephens, "Translating Fildriga," supra note 22 at 39-53.
2iX
Amchem, supra note I at 346.
legislative or significantjudicial reform. 2 1 Further, to facilitate this approach, a modern, non-"parochial" sensibility of comity will need to be applied that includes due consideration for modern pressures, "effects, '22 and realities of economic globalization.
'
Take, for example, the Union Carbide case. In my view, if this expansive jurisdictional approach had been adopted by Keenan J., he could have applied the Piper analysis to the facts of that case and reached the opposite result, thereby allowing the action to proceed in the U.S. Further, this effects-basedjustice argument should prevail, notwithstanding potential objections based on the formal corporate structure of UCC and its UCIL Indian operations. Of significant importance would have been the express consideration that commercial globalization -in that case manifested most clearly in UCIL's operations in India and the resulting damage to the Indian people and environment-has potentially violated the rights of foreign nationals abroad. Given that UCC, through UCIL, took the benefit of its operations in India, it should also have been subject to appropriate responsibilities. If the Court were persuaded that the foreign judicial system could provide adequate justice, then the matter could be stayed; for, as argued above, 222 it is difficult to accept the Court's finding in Union Carbide on this point. To do so, the Court would need to take seriously the question of what justice requires, specifically balancing the demands of modern commercial globalization, the resulting potential violations of international human rights, and whether those rights truly could be adequately protected by the foreign judicial system. I anticipate two challenges to this argument. First, calling for an expansive notion of a justice consideration will open the floodgates to "forum shopping," where a "party seeks out a jurisdiction simply to gain a juridical advantage rather than by reason of a real and substantial connection of the case to thejurisdiction. '' 2 23 As the argument goes, an expansive justice consideration that takes seriously the impact of current forces of commercial globalization will essentially encourage foreign litigants to seek out courts that have plaintifffriendly jurisdiction policies and damage awards. This objection raises valid concerns. However, given the safeguards built into these common law balancing approaches, these considerations can be dealt with through the tools The argument that I am advancing in this article fits within any of the current formulations of the testsHowever, notwithstanding Sopinka J. 's assessment that the three common law tests are "remarkably uniform," the requirement of an express, two-step test -specifically requiring judges to consider justice as a separate factor -may in fact have a potential impact on the way that judges think about the tests, and the way that parties present their cases. Rather than including justice as one of many factors to be balanced, for example, in an Amcheni-type analysis, the Spiliada approach forces all involved specifically to address the justice issue head on. While each test contemplates the issue, form may have an impact on substance in this circumstance. However, whether the Amchem test should be split in a similar fashion to Spiliada is a question for a different project. I am grateful to Ian Smith for raising this argument.
220
See Jayasuriya, supra note 176 at 436-37.
221
For an argument similarly contemplating a liberalized forum non conveniens approach, see Kinley, supra note 82 at 43-44. A second challenge that I anticipate to this argument is the complaint that an expansive notion of jurisdiction will encourage American-style litigation outside of the U.S. As Stephens has commented, "it seems noncontroversial to conclude that the United States is among the countries with the highest rate of recourse to the courts to resolve disputes." 2 25 Further, not only is litigation prevalent in the U.S., the available monetary damages, including punitive damages, are high. Again, as Stephens has pointed out, "[flew nations award punitive damages, and none on the scale of the United States.... Comparative studies of damage awards find ... that U.S. awards are much higher than those in any other country., 226 While on first blush there may be some merit to this point, I do not see it as a fundamental challenge to my argument. First, I am not advocating legislative reform along the lines of the Alien Tort Claims Act. 227 Second, as a practical matter, modem litigation in other Western countries -like Canada -has been becoming more "American" for a number of years, not as a result of jurisdictional determinations, but largely because of our modern, Americanstyle economies. And regardless of whether we think this is a good thing, the reality is that, if we are going to push for expansive trade and commerce principles that expand the reach and depth of commercial globalization, then we need to accept the responsibilities that go with those distributional policy decisions. To the extent that the fruit of our domestic economic policy choices results in serious violations of international human rights around the world, our courts need to be available as sources of remedies when the perpetrators of those rights abuses have appropriate contacts with our domestic courts. Our interpretations of principles of comity and "real and substantial" connection need to make room for this sensibility. 
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Stephens, "Translating Filrtiga," supra note 22 at 24.
22,
Ibid. at 30-3 1. Further, to the extent that government policy and trade regimes continue to provide unsatisfactory protections against the negative impacts of economic globalization, -39 NGOs and other public interest advocates may see international class actions as viable opportunities for regulating negative international economic behaviour. As Walker has further argued, to the extent that multi-jurisdictional classes come to be a viable option for the vindication of collective or group rights, national courts will increasingly become the forum for the debate and resolution of issues that would once have been addressed in political or diplomaticfora ... [Cilass actions relating to international disputes in national courts can generate pressure to change procedural and substantive national law in ways that once might have been left to legislators or members of the executive. On the cautious side, Richard Faulk has warned that the use of class actions internationally needs to be carefully scrutinized in the context of influencing social policy. According to Faulk:
[t]he use of American or, for that matter, any other nation's collective liability devices to resolve claims of non-resident foreign litigants represents a major intrusion into the internal social policies and cultures of sovereign states. Although "globalism" may be useful as a commercial cliche, its intrusion into jurisprudence is disturbing, especially when procedural devices that are not yet recognised internationally are used to resolve claims arising from conduct that occurs beyond the forum state's borders. Accordingly, it is prudent that proposals seeking to expand the use of the class action device internationally, or that would allow the international enforcement of class action judgments by treaty, should be evaluated cautiously. 241 Whether one is bearish or bullish on this point, it seems clear that class actions are becoming important procedural tools for dealing with claims involving international contacts -including international human rights claims -in the context of commercial globalization. 242 2.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Recognition of foreign judgments is another aspect of civil procedure that will become increasingly relevant to this analysis. As Berman has recently argued, "I see jurisdiction and recognition of judgments as fruitful sites for thinking about the relationship between the 'local,' the 'national,' and the 'global' and for mapping the evolving ways in which people construct identity by reference to places and/or communities.
2 4 3 As another recent comment suggested:
23M Supra note 113 at 106-107.
29
For a recent discussion identifying some shortcomings of various international trade regimes, see e.g.
Mendez & Mehmet, supra note 3 at 72-73.
24)
Supra note 113 at 107-109. See also Boyd, supra note 45 at 1208-12.
241
Supra note 237 at 331. [o]ne of the clearest instances where private international law and human rights have intersected is in the area of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, a matter of great practical and commercial significance in circumstances where, whilst an individual or corporation may conduct or transact business throughout the world, that individual or corporation's assets are only located in a particular jurisdiction.
44
The law in Canada on this topic has, as a preliminary matter, until just recently been governed by the judgment of La Forest J. in Morguard. 245 As he stated, largely guided by principles of comity:
2 46 "the courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the language of the United States Constitution, to the judgments given by a court in another province or territory, so long as that court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action.
'2 47 The Court's approach provides for an expansive judicial ability to enforce foreign judgments in light of our modern principles of global commerce. As La Forest J. stated, it is now "imperative" that courts accommodate the flow of "wealth, skills and people" between jurisdictions. 2 48 The Court's approach has subsequently been applied to foreign judgments as well.
2 49 And just recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has now confirmed this approach in its decision in Beals. 25° As Major J. stated, for the majority of the Court: "the 'real and substantial connection' test, which is applied to interprovincial judgments, should apply equally to the recognition of foreign judgments."
'
However, notwithstanding the Morguard formulation, as applied in Beals, Canada does not enforce all foreign judgments.
2 2 To the extent that enforcement in Canada of foreign judgments against entities with Canadian assets is refused, foreign plaintiffs may be left without any meaningful access to a remedy. As Vaughan Black has recognized, "if Canada is the only place the judgment debtor has property, then a foreign judgment we decline to enforce is useless to the judgment creditor.
' 2 53
Again, we see how the issues of globalization, international human rights, and civil procedure cross paths. The decision of whether to enforce a foreign judgment, like a decision of whether to grant jurisdiction, is a meaning-producing act. It potentially means the difference between a remedy granted and a remedy denied. This is, in my view, particularly important if the judgment at issue involves damages against Canadian entities (or entities with Canadian assets) for international human rights-related violations.
While Canadian rules on jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments continue to be largely judge-made, "bit by bit, the Canadian scene is changing. While an analysis of these international regimes is beyond the scope of this project, 259 it is important to note that whether enforcement determinations are based on common law, statutory 26° or treaty-based principles, it will be important to take into consideration the realities of modern global commerce and the workings of MNCs if adequate protection of international human rights is to be granted by domestic courts. 6 To the extent that courts are concerned with issues of "quality of justice, 2 62 "public policy 2 63 or the protection of"naturaljustice" 2 " in the context of foreign proceedings, again, the reality of modern commerce needs to be considered. For example, to the extent that MNCs take the benefit of doing business in foreign jurisdictions, they also need to be aware that their activities may be scrutinized by the courts of those jurisdictions. This is particularly so if efforts to litigate in domestic courts have failed as a result of negative preliminary jurisdictional determinations. If a court rejects a claim on forum non conveniens grounds, based partly on the notion that a foreign state has "the proven capacity to mete out fair and equal justice, that foreign jurisdiction should not be enforced locally. Again, we see the potential importance of procedural determinations -this time after a case has been tried and a judgment has been rendered -when protecting international human rights claims resulting from the negative impacts of commercial globalization. And this will become more important if class actions 266 are increasingly used for the protection of international human rights.
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
A final procedural tool that will become of growing importance for the purpose of this discussion is extraterritorial discovery. Traditionally, evidentiary issues have largely been within the exclusive reach of domestic tribunals. As Elias has commented, "trial evidence is characteristically a matter for the procedural law of the forum., is also an area where international treaty-based rules will increasingly apply. 269 Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, one of Canada's largest law firms, has recently reported that a "by-product" of the growing amount of commerce between Canadians and Americans is an increase in litigation "on both sides of the border involving the need for witnesses on the other side of the border." " This increase in litigation is going to require more cooperation between various judicial systems-a point that has been recognized by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involvement of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such I itigation ... thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects.
27
V. CONCLUSION become even greater. 285 Finally, we are also, not surprisingly, starting to see the globalization of business breakdown in the form of international insolvency matters. 286 This trend will also challenge our traditional procedural approaches and tools.
The two purposes of this article -to highlight the vital role for domestic legal communities in the post-World War II international human rights project, and more generally, to help bring alive the power and increasingly-global context of civil procedure -demonstrate the important convergence of globalization and international human rights on the one hand, and civil procedure on the other. While travelling through Bhopal may help to bring alive this convergence, its significant legal relevance will increasingly start in domestic courts right here at home. 
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See e.g. James M. Farley, "Challenges of Litigation in a Global Economy" in Participatory Justice, supra note 30.
